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Rather than discarding Clausewitz’s theory of war in response to the revolutionary changes in modern warfare, this article articulates a broader theory 
of war based on his concept of the “wondrous trinity,” identifying it as his true legacy. The author shows that the concept of trinitarian war attributed to 
Clausewitz by his critics, which seems to be applicable only to wars between states, is a caricature of Clausewitz’s theory. He goes on to develop Clause-
witz’s theory that war is composed of the three tendencies of violence/force, fighting, and the affiliation of the combatants to a warring community. Each 
war can be analyzed as being composed of these three tendencies and their opposites.
Clausewitz’s “Wondrous Trinity” as  
a Coordinate System of War and Violent Conflict
Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Department of Social and Cultural Studies, University of Applied Sciences, Fulda, Germany
Since the 1990s various influential authors have argued that 
Clausewitz’s theory of war is no longer applicable, both in 
relation to contemporary conflicts and in general (see the 
discussion in Nooy 1997). Some have suggested that it is 
harmful (van Creveld 1991, 1998) and even self-destructive 
(Keegan 1993, 1995) to continue to use this theory as the 
basis for understanding current warfare and as a guide to 
political action, given the revolutionary changes in war 
and violent action occurring in the world’s communities.1 
Clausewitz, it is proposed, was concerned only with war 
between states employing regular armies, whereas conflict 
today mainly involves non-state actors.
Both claims are overdrawn, however, with respect both 
to the core of Clausewitz’s theory (Strachan 2007) and the 
unique characteristics of today’s “new wars” (Kaldor 1999).2 
With the exception of much of Africa and some very old 
conflicts at the fringes of the former empires, existing states, 
along with hierarchically organized political-religious 
groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, are still the decisive, if 
no longer the sole, actors in war. Additionally, Clausewitz 
has much more to say about contemporary forms of warfare 
than the highly selective interpretations by his modern crit-
ics might suggest (Howard 2002; Lonsdale 2004; Angstrom 
and Duyvesteyn 2003; Duyvesteyn 2005). However, the crit-
icisms by Clausewitz’s newest detractors are both provoca-
tive and constructive (Strachan 2007), in that they force us 
to read Clausewitz more exactly (Heuser 2002, 2005; Smith 
2005) and to extract aspects of his work that were previously 
underexposed. The attempt to develop a non-linear theory 
of warfare following Clausewitz’s conception of friction 
(Beyerchen 1992), the updating of his concept of strategy 
(Heuser 2002, 2005), and the adaptation of Clausewitz for 
the information age (Lonsdale 2005) are worth noting.3
A series of authors (Bassford and Villacres 1992; Echevar-
ria 1995a, 1995b, 2003; Handel 2001; Herberg-Rothe 2001a, 
2007) have attempted to foreground the “wondrous trinity” 
that Clausewitz himself describes as his own “Consequenc-
es for Theory” (Clausewitz 1984, 89). Here he indirectly 
1 On Keegan’s criticisms, see Herberg-Rothe 
2001b; on van Creveld see Herberg-Rothe 2001a.
2 For a more sophisticated view than 
that of Kaldor, see Munkler 2004.
3 All of these contributions were presented at 
the conference on “Clausewitz in the Twenty-
first Century,” Oxford, March 2005, and can be 
found in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe 2007.
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repeats his renowned adage that war is “merely the continu-
ation of policy by other means” (87), while at the same time 
identifying it as only one of three principal tendencies of 
which each war is composed.
The significance of the “wondrous trinity” as the starting 
point of Clausewitz’s theory of war is indirectly acknowl-
edged by his present critics, who impute to Clausewitz the 
concept of the “trinitarian war.” Strictly speaking, the con-
cept of the “trinitarian war” does not stem from Clausewitz, 
as it fundamentally contradicts the concept of the “won-
drous trinity.” The former term term actually comes from 
Harry G. Summers, Jr., who, in the early 1980s (as a U.S. 
Army colonel), wrote a most influential book in which he 
analyzed the mistakes made in the Vietnam War by draw-
ing on the example Clausewitz mentions in the “wondrous 
trinity” while flipping Clausewitz’s central point on its head 
in the process (Summers 1982; Heuser 2005, 66–69).
The critique of Clausewitz reduces his whole theory to one 
sentence: war is the continuation of policy. Keegan and van 
Creveld, his most eminent critics, often quote only half of 
the famous phrase: Whereas Clausewitz emphasized a dia-
lectical tension in his formula (war is a continuation of pol-
icy, but using means other than those of policy itself) they 
usually suppress the second part of this inherent tension in 
their interpretations and often even in their quotations. This 
caricature of Clausewitz, which is obviously inadequate as a 
theory to address current developments, is used to con-
struct an unbridgeable gap between “new” and “old” wars 
as well as to call into question the primacy of politics. Ad-
ditionally, much of the criticism of Clausewitz contains hid-
den paradigms which are controversial and problematic in 
their own right, and would require discussion if they were 
not contrasted with the caricature of Clausewitz’s theory. I 
will first discuss the criticisms highlighted by Martin van 
Creveld as a prominent example of such an approach, before 
introducing the “wondrous trinity” and explaining why it 
must be regarded as Clausewitz’s actual legacy (Aron 1980, 
1986; Herberg-Rothe 1998, 2007). Following this I will meth-
odologically interpret the “wondrous trinity” as a uniform, 
comprehensive concept from Clausewitz’s different and in 
part contradictory definitions, terms, and formulas, and 
try to develop this concept into a general theory of violent 
conflict.
1. A Fundamental Paradigm Change
Expectations of a largely peaceful and development-led 
twenty-first century that were widespread in the early 
1990s have been dashed by the brutal wars in Chechnya, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, the numerous wars in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the threat of terrorism, and finally the Iraq war. In 
response, theorists have attempted to bring about a fun-
damental paradigm change in the political theory of war, 
from Clausewitz to Nietzsche—the two names representing 
two contradictory discourses. Martin van Creveld’s anti-
Clausewitzian approach is of course “pure Nietzsche,” as he 
himself emphasized (van Creveld 2000).
At first sight Clausewitz’s discourse would seem not to of-
fer an adequate basis for understanding the development 
of current types of warfare, or the shift from war between 
states to war that is globalized but basically domestic. The 
key problem, however, is not the changes in global war and 
violence, but the assessment of this process. In parts of 
the discourse in political theory, the indisputable changes 
serve as arbitrary examples, as a way of bringing about a 
more fundamental shift from the primacy of politics and 
civil society—via the military—to the primacy of violent 
fighting.4
Van Creveld’s acknowledgment of his debt to Nietzsche 
helps to elucidate his theoretical approach—without getting 
into a separate Nietzsche discussion, which would be a dif-
ferent debate. Sentences from van Creveld’s work, like his 
statement that it is violent fighting which gives meaning to 
4 In German, Clausewitz  always uses the term 
Kampf, which can be translated by “struggle,” 
“fight,” or even “combat,” depending on context. 
I have chosen to use “fighting” or  “fight” as best 
expressing Clausewitz‘s concept. A similar problem 
arises with Clausewitz’s term Gewalt, which can 
be translated as either “force” or “violence.” Here 
I choose “violence,” which in most cases should 
be understood as violent action. Rather than 
searching for a single translation for every term, 
I recognize that  Clausewitz’s terms articulate 
tensions within the concepts they denote. In 
some cases I have tried to mark these tensions 
by using more than one possible translation, for 
example: “fight/struggle” or “violence/force.”
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human life, no longer appear just as an incomprehensible 
accompaniment to a basically correct analysis of current 
changes, but reveal the fundamental premises of this non-
Clausewitzian theoretical approach. Following Nietzsche, 
with his statement that war was not the continuation of pol-
itics, but politics the continuation of war by other means, 
Michel Foucault seemed to bring this counter-program to 
Clausewitz to the heart of the debate (Foucault 2003).5
This giving primacy to violent fighting has overturned the 
original intentions in some of the civil war discussion of 
the 1990s. Trutz von Trotha’s attempt to shed light on the 
tendency of every war to be a social action in itself and to 
become independent of any purpose from outside led to a 
problematic conclusion that seems to be a reversal of his 
original intentions: with respect to civil wars, Trutz von 
Trotha predicted a development for Europe similar to the 
one that can currently be observed in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Von Trotha argues that in world-historical terms, the idea 
of the primacy of the public good in the state and public 
space, that heritage of the Greek polis, can only be consid-
ered as “exotic.” The western world would now return slowly 
to historical normality, which has always been the reality in 
Africa: to the concentric order in which the priority of the 
primary, special relationship applies—the commitment to 
whoever is nearest to us. According to von Trotha, sub-
Saharan Africa foretells the future of the western world.6
On the one hand this perspective seems to constitute a 
warning of seemingly endless wars, and even genocide, that 
would not be limited to sub-Saharan Africa. Von Trotha 
states, however, that this is also the “future,” which realizes 
what the West has always attributed to the modern age: 
movement, experimentation, and the invention of new ways 
of exercising political power, a remarkable individualism 
of risk and power. Developing this position, von Trotha 
argues that civilization is reverting to “Bellum omnium 
contra omnes” in the “classic Hobbesian sense” because the 
modern war of the state not only condemns man to a life 
that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” but also is 
able to put an end to it (Trotha 1999, 92–94). When even the 
horrors of war and violence in Africa are seen in relative 
terms, with reference to an exemplary individualism of risk 
and might, the questionable consequences of this kind of 
discourse become obvious.
This change in priorities with its emphasis on violent fight-
ing, including the inversion of Clausewitz’s formula, has be-
come established outside the civil war discussion. Samuel P. 
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” is a prominent example 
of this paradigm change (even though Huntington’s exposi-
tions are clearly more sophisticated). According to Hun-
tington, people use politics not only to claim their interests, 
but also to define their own identity: “We know who we are 
only when we know who we are not and often only when we 
know whom we are against” (Huntington 1997, 21). In this 
way, Huntington formulates a significant aspect of the non-
Clausewitzian paradigm, the rejection of an instrumental 
view of war and violence, and replaces it with the view that 
war relates to identity.
I should emphasize that the current critics of Clausewitz go 
beyond questioning whether his concept of the relation of 
policy or politics to war is still adequate to address the cur-
rent changes in warfare. More important, they reduce his 
complex theory of dynamic relations to a single formula, in 
order to contrast this seemingly inadequate approach with 
their own concepts.
5 It has to be acknowledged that despite this ap-
parent claim, such statements must not always be 
interpreted in a generalized sense (Lemke 2008), 
but also be considered with respect to the context 
of the proposition itself as well as the context in 
which Foucault made the statement. For example, 
Foucault was correct concerning the understanding 
of politics during and between the two world wars. 
In the case of Clausewitz, Foucault later reversed 
his statement by acknowledging that Clausewitz’s 
proposition was correct within a particular context: 
Clausewitz’s formula would have merit concerning 
the period of the institutionalization of the military, 
and  the perpetuation of the military as an institu-
tion  would not indicate the presence of warfare in 
times of peace, but of diplomacy within a broader 
concept of politics. (Foucault 2007, 305–306). In 
my opinion Foucault’s proposition can be a useful 
tool for analyzing some historical developments 
and thus has some merit. Nevertheless, as a general 
proposition this statement would not only be wrong, 
but would have problematic consequences. In 
my view it is nearly impossible to distinguish in 
Foucault’s writings between statements which are 
only valid within a particular context and those 
which could be regarded as propositions in general.
6 Trotha (2000) simply adopts some as-
pects of the approach of Robert Kaplan 
(1994) and overemphasizes them.
208IJCV : Vol. 3 (2) 2009, pp. 204 – 219Andreas Herberg-Rothe: Clausewitz’s “Wondrous Trinity”
2. The “Wondrous Trinity”
Clausewitz’s “wondrous trinity” is found at the end of the 
first chapter of Book I of his On War under the heading 
“Consequences for Theory.” He states: “War is more than a 
true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the 
given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tenden-
cies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be 
regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and 
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; 
and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of 
policy, which makes it subject” to pure reason (Clausewitz 
1984, 88–89; 1980, 213).7
What is immediately apparent about the wondrous trinity 
is that it reiterates the primacy of policy, but as only one of 
three tendencies. Moreover it must be stressed that at least 
two of these tendencies are extreme contrasts: primordial 
violence in conjunction with hatred and enmity “which 
are to be regarded as a blind natural force,” on the one 
hand, and the subordinated nature of war as a political tool 
“which makes it subject to pure reason,” on the other.
In the paragraph on the wondrous trinity Clausewitz writes 
that the first of these tendencies “mainly” (mehr) concerns 
the people, the second mainly the general and his army, and 
the third mainly the government. It cannot be inferred from 
this qualifier “mainly” that this “second trinity” (Heuser 
2002) is actually Clausewitz’s true concept, as Summers has 
claimed. This second trinity in the form of “trinitarian war” 
of People/Population/Nation, Army/General, and Govern-
ment is used by Clausewitz as a practical example, while 
the wondrous trinity through its three tendencies—the 
primordial violence of war, the play of chance and prob-
ability, and the subordinating nature of war—is defined as 
a political tool. A fundamental difference between Clause-
witz’s wondrous trinity and the concept of trinitarian war 
as originally developed by Summers and van Creveld is that 
the three elements are ordered into a hierarchical structure 
with People/Population/Nation as its base, Army/General 
above, and Government at the top (as explicitly expressed 
by Peter Waldmann in the preface to van Creveld 1998). 
This hierarchical construction of the trinitarian war is his-
torically explicable, and in certain instances a meaningful 
explanatory model. However, it does not correspond with 
Clausewitz’s formulation and even conflicts with it to some 
extent.
Clausewitz stresses that “[t]hese three tendencies are like 
three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and 
yet variable in their relationship to one another” (Clause-
witz 1984, 89; Clausewitz 1980, 213). This means nothing 
more than that these three tendencies, although common 
to all wars, can, in their respective limited socio-historic in-
stances, have a different meaning and influence—although 
without leaving out any one of them. In contrast, establish-
ing a hierarchy between the three tendencies asserts an 
established relationship, which directly contradicts Clause-
witz’s formulation.
3. The Riddle of the First Chapter
Clausewitz’s work contains a crucial passage that was 
evidently inserted very late as a result of his analyses of 
Napoleon’s campaigns and which may explain the overall 
structure of the first chapter, with all its internal contra-
dictions. Clausewitz writes: “Once again we must remind 
the reader that, in order to lend clarity, distinction, and 
emphasis to our ideas, only perfect contrasts, the extremes 
of the spectrum, have been included in our observations. 
As an actual occurrence, war generally falls somewhere in 
between, and is influenced by these extremes only to the 
extent to which it approaches them” (Clausewitz 1984, 517; 
1980, 859). Clausewitz’s contemporary Hegel, whose lectures 
in Berlin were probably known to Clausewitz, maintained 
that truth could not be spoken in a single sentence; for 
him, as for Clausewitz, every statement requires a counter-
statement.8 The statements and counter-statements made by 
Clausewitz “are like weights and counterweights, and one 
7 Clausewitz’s phrase wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit 
has been variously translated as a “paradoxical”, 
or “strange” trinity, among other formulations. 
When citing from other works, I follow their 
authors’ translations. Nonetheless I am convinced 
that the original meaning is best translated by 
“wondrous trinity,” which Clausewitz chose to 
express something that astonished him: the floating 
balance of conflicting tendencies within war.
8 On the relationship between Clausewitz 
and Hegel, see Herberg-Rothe 2000.
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could say that through their play and interplay the scales of 
truth are brought into balance.”9
From this methodological point of view, Clausewitz’s for-
mulation of opposing, apparently contradictory definitions 
of war, even within the first chapter of Book I, is explicable. 
Of additional importance is that, in this first chapter, 
Clausewitz often interrupts his discussion to directly bring 
up the respective counter-statement to a given idea. For 
example, he explains the transition of the three interactions 
to the extreme to the three tendencies of limited war with 
reference to the opposition of idea and reality: in theory 
each war tends to the absolute, but in reality it is limited. 
(Clausewitz 1984, 75–78; 1980, 192–99; for more details, see 
Herberg-Rothe 2001a and 2007). What is decisive, however, 
is the very sudden transition from one pole to its opposite. 
Similarly, Clausewitz argues that, among all human activi-
ties, war is most closely related to a game of cards, in order 
to stress uncertainty of the outcome, and then immediately 
breaks off to insist that war remains “nonetheless a seri-
ous means to a serious end” (Clausewitz 1984, 85–86; 1980, 
207–209). Apparently the pursuit of only one pole in an op-
posing pair indeed leads at the beginning of an argument to 
a true statement, although it does not determine the whole 
war so that, in Clausewitz’s view, the respective counter-
statement must be formed from scratch.
What is actually problematic is that within the first 
chapter Clausewitz articulated the respective “extreme 
opposites” in conjunction with the categories “Definition,” 
“Concept,” and “Result for Theory,” as well as in an appar-
ently simple formula. Until now it has remained unex-
plained if there is a contemporary or systematic derivation 
of Definition, Concept, and Theory10 that Clausewitz is 
referring to, or if he kept these categories unreflective. It 
must also be noted that the connection of some poles of 
these opposites with the categories of Definition, Concept, 
and Theory had partially catastrophic consequences—for 
instance, the “destruction principle” and the extreme of 
the three interactions, viewed in isolation, could be taken 
as Clausewitz’s actual concept of war and universalized 
(the historical consequences of this interpretation are 
explored in Heuser 2002).11
But if we take seriously Clausewitz’s claim that the won-
drous trinity is the summation of his analysis in his first 
chapter, we can bring what he called “unity and clarity” to 
our examination. Clausewitz identifies the three tenden-
cies of the wondrous trinity as the primordial violence 
of war, the play of probability and chance in war, and the 
subordinated nature of war as a political tool (Clausewitz 
1984, 89; 1980, 212–13). However, he uses a very broad po-
litical term here that refers not exclusively to state action, 
but to any purposeful action by organized communities.
The second of Clausewitz’s three tendencies is the play 
of chance and probability, which relates to the unknown 
outcome of the fight (Herberg-Rothe 2001a, chap. 6; 
2007, chap. 4). At the beginning of Book II he states: 
“Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only ef-
fective principle in the manifold activities generally 
designated as war” (Clausewitz 1984, 127; 1980, 269). In 
addition, although Clausewitz stresses (at the begin-
ning of the second chapter of Book I) how varied are the 
forms of fighting in war, how far it may be removed from 
the brute discharge of hatred and enmity in a physical 
encounter, and how many variables come into play that 
are not themselves fighting, it would nevertheless be 
inherent in the very concept of war that all effects must 
originally derive from fighting (Clausewitz 1984, 95; 1980, 
222). It must be emphasized, finally, that although fight-
ing is inherent within each war, it is only one tendency of 
9 Karl Linnebach, cited by Werner Hahl-
weg in an appendix to the German edition 
of On War (Clausewitz 1980, p. 1361).
10 J. G. C. Kiesewetter, a pupil of Kant’s and the 
author of Outline of a General Logic following Kan-
tian Principles (Berlin, 1795), should most probably 
be considered here. Clausewitz attended some of 
Kiesewetter’s lectures. The beginning of Clause-
witz’s first chapter, with the three reciprocal actions 
as concept of war, may correspond with Hegel’s 
transition from reciprocal actions to the concept (see 
Herberg-Rothe 2000). However, the drift between 
the opposites in the wondrous trinity, as well as the 
methodological passage mentioned above, are in-
stead related to Kiesewetter’s conception of conflict 
(this reference I owe to Antulio Echevarria). Clause-
witz’s concept of attack and defense nevertheless 
shows that he adopted to some extent a middle way 
between Kant and Hegel: he stresses Hegelian ideas 
of reciprocal transition between opposites, but these 
remain drifting between the contrasts. For referenc-
es to this interpretation and its utilization for general 
philosophical problems, see Herberg-Rothe 2005.
11 This interpretation also takes the form of an ideal 
type in Max Weber’s sense; see Kleemeier 2002.
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the whole of war in Clausewitz’s concept of the wondrous 
trinity.12
If we generalize the second tendency in this sense and con-
sider Clausewitz’s very general conception of politics (Poli-
tik), then the wondrous trinity states that war is composed 
of the tendencies of its primordial violence, the imponder-
ability of fighting, and its subordinated nature as purpo-
sive collective action—in short, violence, fighting, and the 
membership of the combatants in a community. Even more 
briefly put: War is the violent fighting of communities. If 
we differentiate each of these three aspects and investigate 
their interaction, the inner structure of the first chapter as 
a guide for Clausewitz’s entire work and as starting point 
for a theory of war is revealed. Whether this corresponds 
totally to Clausewitz’s own thought processes or whether it 
represents mainly my own creation may remain in dispute.
4. Clausewitz’s Concept of the Political
While, according to his critics, Clausewitz is outdated 
because his theory refers primarily to inter-state war,13 his 
proponents emphasize the continued utility and relevance 
of his work. Antulio Echevarria writes, Clausewitz’s “con-
ception of war, his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of the 
relationship between politics and war will remain valid as 
long as states, drug lords, warrior clans, and terrorist groups 
have mind to wage it.” The starting point for this position is 
a differentiation and expansion of Clausewitz’s conception 
of politics. It has long been known by Clausewitz scholars 
that he often articulated completely different dimensions of 
the political, without making sufficient distinctions (Eche-
varria 1995a; Diner 1980; Aron 1980, 1986). Thus Aron dis-
tinguishes between two dimensions: first, objective politics 
as the whole of the socio-political condition, and second, 
subjective policy as “guiding intelligence” (Clausewitz 1984, 
607; 1980, 993).14
Similarly, Dan Diner explicitly distinguishes two forms 
of Clausewitz’s concept of politics. The first form of the 
term is understood as a purposive-rational goal-oriented 
organized use of force. This purposive rationality refers to 
every martial action. In contrast, Clausewitz’s concept of 
Politik can also be understood as action-relevant expres-
sion of social conditions, which precede the use of force and 
are not arbitrarily manipulated by its actions. The politi-
cal in this sense is a willful steering concept of means and 
purpose-extracted substance, which similarly goes along 
with the prevailing social traffic (Diner 1980, 447–48; Aron 
1980, 389). It is worth mentioning that Clausewitz used this 
second conception mainly in analyzing the influence of the 
French Revolution on warfare as well as the final defeat of 
Napoleon at Waterloo, whereas the first concept is more re-
lated to the failures of the Prussian leadership and of other 
European powers to recognize the revolutionary changes in 
warfare and act appropriately.
An even broader interpretation of Clausewitz’s idea of 
politics is evident in Echevarria’s argument that “Clausewitz 
used Politik as an historically causative force, providing an 
explanatory pattern or framework viewing war’s various 
manifestations over time” (Echevarria 1995a). This interpre-
tation relies on a chapter which researchers have insuffi-
ciently considered, in which Clausewitz tries to clarify the 
connection between “political aim” (Clausewitz 1984, 586; 
1980, 961) and the concrete process of warfare, while at the 
same time using a very general concept of politics.15 Here 
Clausewitz determines that historical wars are dependent 
not on deliberate decisions or political relations in the nar-
12 Paret and Howard translate the German 
term Kampf in this paragraph as “combat.” 
For the purpose of generalizing Clausewitz’s 
concept I’m using the term “fighting,” in ac-
cordance with their own translation of the term 
at the beginning of Book II: “Essentially war is 
fighting” (Clausewitz 1984, 127; 1980, 269).
13 Paradoxically, Clausewitz’s most famous critics 
consider his work to be outdated for completely dif-
ferent and indeed contradictory reasons. For Keegan 
(1993), Clausewitz is the fundamental theoretician of 
boundless and “modern” war, from whom humanity 
must turn away in order not to perish, while van 
Creveld (1991) argues that Clausewitz propagates 
limited warfare, with such a limited starting point 
that no war can be won against opponents who 
are fighting for their very existence and identity.
14 Clausewitz also uses the term “intelligence of 
the personified state” to justify that limited and 
unlimited forms of warfare are equally deter-
mined by policy (Clausewitz 1984, 88; 1980, 212). 
The status of the term “intelligence” is thus not 
entirely unequivocal. I use this term to express 
the subjective autonomy of political actions.
15 Related to Part B of the third chapter of Book 
VIII (Clausewitz 1984, 585–94; 1980, 960–74).
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rower sense, but on the political attitude of communities 
as well as states. His recounting includes “semi-barbarous 
Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and 
trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings 
and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century.” All 
these communities conducted war “in their own particular 
way, using different methods and pursuing different aims” 
(Clausewitz 1984, 586; 1980, 962). Despite this variability, 
Clausewitz stresses that war is also in these cases a continu-
ation of their politics by other means.
In this manner Clausewitz’s apparently clear statements 
relativize themselves: war is merely a continuation of state 
politics only if we apply a restrictive modern understand-
ing of the state. By the term “state” Clausewitz evidently 
means, at least in Book VIII and in his historical studies, 
the political and social orientation of a community. In the 
modern state, this orientation  a relative independence from 
the respective social relations; where the Tartars and other 
forms of non-state warfare are concerned, the independence 
of political decisions is limited and they correspond more 
to the societal attitude to the ways and means of warfare.16 
However, it is questionable whether it is meaningful today 
to adopt such a general sense of politics—meaning the 
political-social or even the culturally caused attitude of a 
community—in order to apply Clausewitz’s formula of war 
as continuation of policy by other means to all forms of war 
(as Duyvesteyn [2005] is doing). The danger here is that a 
modern political concept is being applied to other social re-
lations and by doing so the actual dynamics of these social 
relations are missed.
It could be worthwhile to replace Clausewitz’s term “state” 
with the concept of “community,” which may be a politi-
cal society, social community, or religious or otherwise 
oriented community (or, of course, a modern state). Such an 
inclusive concept corresponds far more closely to his under-
standing of “state policy” than the more modern under-
standing. In the case of modern states, war is composed of 
violence, fighting, and the policy of the state; in the case of 
other communities it is also composed o violence, fighting, 
and actions derived from the orientation of this community 
and its purposes, goals or identity.17
5. Violence and Fighting
At first glance, war is distinguished from other human ac-
tions by the massive use of force; it is a violent action, and 
force is based on the asymmetrical relationship between 
active power and suffering. With the use of force arises 
the fundamental problem of its becoming independent of 
its rational purpose, a problem to which Wolfgang Sofsky 
referred when he wrote that force and violence are self-
escalating (Sofsky 1996, 62). Clausewitz described this “act 
of independence” of force thus: “war is an act of violence, 
and there is no logical limit to the application of that force” 
(Clausewitz 1984, 77; 1980, 194). Without denying the ten-
dency for violence to become independent of any rational 
purpose in war, especially in direct combat, nonetheless 
violence in war is not an end in itself but a means of ex-
pressing the interests, values, and culture of a community. 
Uncontrolled violence, for Clausewitz, is dysfunctional 
in principle and even self-destructive, as he learned in his 
analysis of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (Herberg-Rothe 
2001a, 44ff; 2007).
How is war different from other forms of mass violence? 
Genocides are very often accompanied by war—for in-
stance, the genocide of the Armenians before the First 
World War and the murder of Jews in the Second World 
War—but even these cases are described as genocide and 
not war between nations (Völkerkrieg). In addition to the 
aspect of mass violence, war needs a minimum of real 
fighting or struggle—otherwise it would be a massacre, 
mass destruction, or mass murder (Waldmann 1998, 16ff). 
The occupation of Czechoslovakia by the German armed 
forces, for example, was not a war, but rather an annexa-
tion. Clausewitz brought this problem to a head in noting 
that war actually begins with defense, not with attack. Only 
16 I develop this distinction from my critique 
of John Keegan; Herberg-Rothe 2001b.
17 Hans Delbrück made the connection between 
war and the social order of the community into 
the pivotal point of his monumental work, Ge-
schichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen 
Geschichte (rev. ed., 2000); Clausewitz himself 
clarified this connection specifically in his writ-
ing on “Agitation” (Clausewitz 1992, 335–68).
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when one party defends itself against a massive use of force 
does a real fighting, and thus a real war, arise: “Essentially, 
the concept of war does not originate with the attack, 
because the ultimate object of attack is not fighting: rather 
it is possession. The idea of war originates with the defense, 
which does have fighting as its immediate object” (Clause-
witz 1984, 377; 1980, 644).
How are violence and force differentiated from fighting? 
Force and violence are marked by the aforementioned 
asymmetrical relationship between action and suffering. 
Fighting, in contrast, requires a minimum of symmetry 
between the combatants—Clausewitz’s term for this is the 
duel (Clausewitz 1984, 75; 1980, 191). To sustain this mini-
mum of symmetry between warring parties, in the course 
of the development of war combatants established conven-
tions: war is bound by rules about the purpose and means 
of fighting, and about who may be allowed to do the killing 
and who may be killed. Without such admittedly limited 
conventions, every warring community or society would 
internally disintegrate. The outward exercise of violence 
would no longer have any boundaries that could protect the 
inner community.
In war, communities “stand against” each other. Clausewitz 
stressed that combat in war is not a fight (Kampf) of indi-
viduals against individuals, but rather of armed forces, that 
is, an “armed people”: “Everything that occurs in war re-
sults from the existence of armed forces” (Clausewitz 1984, 
95; 1980, 222).18 Because they deploy weapons as instruments 
for killing other human beings, armed forces must have a 
minimum of organizing structures and principles, in order 
to distinguish between “friend and foe” (Carl Schmitt); 
these organizing structures of the armed forces themselves 
create or are related to a community, which is “superior” 
to the armed forces themselves. Fighting communities 
can take various forms: religious, ethnic, or cultural units, 
clans, heterogeneous communities under warlords, or 
states. Affiliation to one of these communities determines 
not only the fight’s goal and purpose, but also the ways and 
means of warfare. Thomas Hobbes’s famous reference to a 
“war of all against all” is not really war, but rather the rule 
of naked, pure violence.
A fight between two or more opponents can concern the ac-
quisition of goods and advantages of power, or the preserva-
tion of one’s own existence and identity. There are certainly 
combinations of these objectives and cases in which they 
cannot unequivocally be differentiated. The goal of preserv-
ing one’s own identity and existence as an ethnic group, na-
tion, or tribe can lead straight to the conquest of opposing 
areas and the destruction of one’s opponents. The violent 
exclusion of minorities, a significant characteristic of the 
twentieth century, was based on this make-believe defense 
and the retention of  ethnic or national identity.19
In many cases the opponent is coerced through violence to 
do our will (Clausewitz 1984, 75; 1980, 191). But this can be 
achieved in two different ways. The first is by causing the 
opponent the greatest possible damage. Pre-modern forms 
of warfare often did not involve battles between opposing 
armies, but rather took the form of devastation of the op-
ponent’s territories. The aim of such destructive measures 
was the same as the aim of a decisive battle, to force the 
opponent to obey the attacker’s will; but the means was the 
infliction of the most damage. Some examples are the wars 
of the Cossacks and the invasions that ended the Roman 
Empire. Throughout most of history wars at the edges of 
great civilizations took this form. The raids of plundering 
tribes created havoc and destruction, forcing the empires to 
pay subsidies to the plunderers to stop such raids (Munkler 
2007).
In contrast to this last kind of war, warfare in Europe from 
the end of the Thirty Years’ War until the First World 
War was to a large extent characterized by the avoidance 
of indiscriminate, socially extensive destruction within 
Europe. The lamentable experiences of the Thirty Years’ 
18 In German, Clausewitz uses, as always, the 
term Kampf, which Howard and Paret translate 
as “combat” but which I prefer to translate as 
“fighting” (Clausewitz 1984, 95; 1980, 22–23).
19 For the distinction between instrumental 
warfare and essential warfare, and their im-
portance in history, see Münkler 1992, 92ff.
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War, in which approximately one third of Europe’s popula-
tion perished either directly from war or indirectly from its 
consequences, led to a historically unique containment of 
war. Unlike wars at the borders of the great empires (Rome, 
Byzantium, China) the destruction in the Thirty Years’ 
War could not be limited to the periphery or to lesser allied 
nations (Hilfsvölker); instead, destruction ravaged the heart 
of Europe.20 The crucial innovation of the new containment 
of warfare after the Thirty Years’ War was that a military 
defeat no longer jeopardized the defeated party’s existence 
or led automatically to widespread destruction of territories 
and persecution of populations. Battles were fought mainly 
outside the towns and decisions were sought on the battle-
field in order to shorten the war. Even Napoleon, whose 
armies conquered almost the whole of Europe, and who 
determined its rulers by his own political will, did not wage 
war against specific populations. This European Sonderweg 
in warfare was a direct reaction to the devastation of the 
Thirty Years’ War.
But the history of war is characterized by paradoxes. On 
one hand, the focus on decisive battles between regular 
armies served to protect the European civilian population. 
On the other hand, the advent of industrialized war with 
machine guns, armored vehicles, aircraft, virtually unlim-
ited production of weaponry, and the shortening of supply 
routes through a developed rail system, meant that clinging 
to a strategy of decisive battles led to catastrophic loss of life 
in the First World War. In order to force a decision, whole 
armies and nations were bled dry. Finally, in the Second 
World War the civilian population once again became a 
military target. The limitation of warfare in Europe since 
the Thirty Years’ War is not separable from its consequenc-
es in the catastrophes of the First and Second World Wars.
The limitation of warfare within Europe is also not sepa-
rable from the contrasting experience in the colonies, where 
the same armies that showed a maximum of restraint 
against European opponents often led destructive cam-
paigns against native populations. In 1898 British troops in 
Egypt mowed down thousands of rebel Mahdi fighters with 
only six Maxim guns. This was no clash between armies, 
but rather a massacre. The Mahdi fighters simply could not 
comprehend the firepower of this new weapon and kept on 
charging at the British position (Diner 2000). The European 
armies themselves also learned little from this experience: 
in the First World War their own infantry and cavalry 
charged without any cover, at first with heroic songs on 
their lips, into the fire of the machine guns.
The “new wars” (Munkler 2004) we are witnessing today are 
nothing fundamentally new in the historical development 
of war. What is new, however, are the intermixed fields, in 
which different forms of war are no longer spatially separate 
from one another, but rather overlap (Munkler 2004). For 
a long time, the European state-centered form of war was 
recognized as the norm, while non-state forms of violence 
were characterized as primitive throwbacks or as expres-
sions of irregular violence. This perspective is not useful, 
as it is unable to comprehend contemporary developments; 
but it would be equally inadequate to view inter-state war 
merely as a historical exception to the rule. War is therefore 
understood here as a phenomenon which is composed of 
opposite tendencies: violence/force, fighting, and the affili-
ation of the fighters to a community. Throughout history, 
there have always been phases in which one of these three 
aspects seems to have determined the war as a whole. Nev-
ertheless, following Clausewitz, each war is composed of all 
three tendencies, whose meaning and influence varies due 
to aspects such as the development of weapons, societal-
historical circumstances, and relations among the warring 
communities as well as their internal characteristics.
6. The Wondrous Trinity as a Differentiated Coordinate System
Clausewitz divides each of the three tendencies of the won-
drous trinity further into additional oppositions, in which 
his various definitions of war arise as “moments.” Each war 
can be located within these opposites, depending on histori-
20 Some scholars nevertheless argue that the limita-
tions of warfare after the Thirty Years’ War resulted 
from the socialization of violence (Verstaatlichung) 
and depended on the control that the state was now 
able to exercise (Foucault 2003). That is surely an 
aspect of historical development, but I think that a 
political input was additionally needed, such as the 
experience of endless suffering during the Thirty 
Years’ War, just as after the World War II, though 
in contrast to developments after World War I.
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cal, social, political, and cultural conditions. These opposi-
tions are typical of every war, and each is influenced by 
socio-historic circumstances. These opposing tendencies are 
like “different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and 
yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory 
that ignores any one of them would conflict with reality to 
such an extent that for this reason alone”, it would imme-
diately become involved in such a contradiction with the 
reality that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that 
alone, Clausewitz emphasizes (Clausewitz 1984, 89; 1980, 
213). I will lay out four oppositions within the three concept-
fields (Begriffsfelder) of “violence/force,” “fighting,” and 
the fighters’ “community” in order to explain the various 
aspects of the coordinate system introduced in this article. 
The basic thesis is very simple: that every real war is in part 
similarly but also differently composed of these tendencies.21
5.1 Gewalt: Violence/Force
(a)  The crucial opposition within Clausewitz’s concept of 
violence or force (Gewalt) is that of violence as instru-
mentality versus violence’s assuming an independent 
existence (Verselbständigung). The instrumental pole of 
this pair of opposites is found in Clausewitz’s definition 
(75) and in the world-renowned formula (87), as well 
as in the third tendency of the wondrous trinity (89). 
Clausewitz discussed the problem of violence’s becom-
ing absolute and therefore an end in itself in the three 
interactions to the extreme (75–78), directly before the 
formula (87), as well as in the primordial violence of war 
in the first of the three tendencies of war’s wondrous 
trinity (89).
(b)  A significant contrast, which Clausewitz implicitly and 
repeatedly brings up, is whether the combatants are 
amateurs or specialists in violence. He did not formulate 
this opposition explicitly, but invoked it in his explana-
tion of the success of the French Revolution’s troops over 
those of the ancien régime.22 The politically, ideological-
ly, and/or religiously defined motivation of combatants 
opposes a knightly code of honor.23
(c)  Clausewitz also brings up the fundamental opposition 
between distance and proximity in the use of force. Dis-
tance makes a relative rationality possible, while bring-
ing the problem of impersonal killing—in which the 
humanity of the opponent is effaced by large separations 
of time, space, or social distance (Bauman 1989, 1991). 
Using force or violence “face to face” with an opponent 
calls on different characteristics; for example, aggressive-
ness and hate can lead to an increasingly independent 
use of force, but at the same time still make it possible to 
perceive the opponent as human.
(d)  A further criterion is the means of force and violence. 
This problem is not separately posed by Clausewitz and 
must be supplemented here. A significant factor is the fi-
nancing of combatants’ weapons. The risk of losing very 
expensive weapons systems and highly trained combat-
ants can lead to a certain limitation of war (as was the 
case in the eighteenth century). In contrast, wars waged 
with inexpensive weaponry and fighters are more likely 
to escalate.
5.2 Kampf: Fight
(a)  The necessity of escalation in war in order not to be de-
feated is found in Clausewitz’s three interactions to the 
extreme (75–78), whereas the game of chance and prob-
ability is discussed in the second of the three tendencies 
of the wondrous trinity (89) as well as in the respective 
sections of the first chapter concerning war as a gamble 
(85–86), and finally in the section about friction (119).
(b)  The condition of symmetry or asymmetry between 
combatants (so often discussed today), in their strategy 
as well as the social composition of their armed forces, is 
discussed by Clausewitz in the first chapter, with refer-
ence to the opposition of attack and defense (82-84), in 
detail throughout Book VI about defense, and general-
ized in the second chapter of Book I (93–94).
(c)  A crucial distinction within the first chapter is whether 
combat in war is directed against the opposing will (as 
21 I have tried to use this coordinate system to out-
line a general social history of war in Herberg-Rothe 
2003. For better readability in the following discus-
sion, page references refer only to Clausewitz 1984.
22 For the meaning of this distinction, see 
Herberg-Rothe 2003, in particular the ty-
pology of combatants, pp. 60-83.
23 This opposite is most clearly empha-
sized by John Keegan (1993), and in a more 
sophisticated manner by Michael Ignati-
eff (1998); see also Herberg-Rothe 2003.
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in Clausewitz’s definition of war, p. 75) or if it is directed 
toward the destruction of the opposing armed forces. 
Clausewitz understands the latter as reducing them to 
such a condition that they can no longer continue to 
fight (90). But the original and lasting opposition be-
tween these two aims is merely repeated in Clausewitz’s 
differentiation of the principle of destruction (90–94).24
(d)  For a long time, Clausewitz favored Napoleon’s strategy, 
in which the armed forces of the opponent are directly 
attacked. Clausewitz’s critics, however, favor an indirect 
strategy (see Heuser 2002). For a general theory of war, 
Clausewitz thus needs to be supplemented, so that in 
addition to considering a direct strategy against the op-
posing armed forces, we start from the assumption that 
every war is a combination of direct and indirect tenden-
cies, which are differently composed in each different 
instance.
5.3 Warring Communities
(a)  It is first necessary to discern whether warring com-
munities are relatively new or long-existing groups. In 
newly constructed communities, violence plays a more 
constitutive role, while in long-existing societies, more 
aspects contribute to the war.25 Thus Clausewitz argues 
that the length of time a group has existed reduces the 
tendency to escalation in the interactions to the extreme, 
as other factors must be included that may affect the 
course of the war. Clausewitz emphasizes that war is 
never an isolated act: it does not consist of a single short 
blow and its result is never final (78–81).
(b)  A further opposition concerns whether the war serves 
the self-preservation of a community or society or, espe-
cially in revolutionary situations, whether it leads to the 
formation of new ones (Münkler 1992).
(c)  Yet another opposition concerns whether war is subor-
dinated to the following of “interests” or the spreading 
of the values, norms, or ideals of the related community. 
Herfried Münkler juxtaposes both contrasts (b) and 
(c), noting the opposition between the “instrumental” 
compositions of war of the later Clausewitz against the 
“existentialism” of the early Clausewitz (Münkler 1992).
(d)  Closely related to this, although not exactly congruent, is 
the question of whether the purpose of war lies outside 
of or within the fight of warring cultures. The social 
composition of each society, like those of the combatants 
(regular armies, conscription armies, pistoleros, etc.), 
plays an important role here.26
If we summarize these fundamental differences, the follow-
ing coordinate system of war and violent conflict emerges.
24 Compare only the beginning of the first chapter 
of Book VIII, in which it is retrospectively sum-
marized as “and we concluded that the grand 
objective of all military action is to overthrow 
the enemy—which means destroying his armed 
forces” (577) with “We can see now that in war 
many roads lead to success, and that they do not 
all involve the opponent’s outright defeat” (94).
25 I do not wish to assert that all communities are 
constituted by force and violence, as one could 
interpret the theory of Carl Schmitt. Here I’m 
only emphasizing the difference between newly 
constituted communities and long-existing ones and 
their different practices of violence. Nevertheless the 
so-called “new wars” could be better described in 
terms of Carl Schmitt than those of Thomas Hobbes; 
see Herberg-Rothe 2004 and Herberg-Rothe 2006. 
This difference for example played a most important 
role in the misunderstanding of Hezbollah by 
the Israel Defense Forces in the last Lebanon war. 
Obviously Hezbollah was seen as something like a 
“warlord system,” which consequently would break 
down after a short blow against its infrastructure. 
In retrospect one could even argue that the war 
strengthened the militia and its social cohesion.
26 Here I explicitly do not differentiate among 
culture, society, and community, in order to empha-
size the difference between internal and external 
influences on the conduct of war. In different 
circumstances these influences from outside may be 
determined by culture, society, or the political com-
munity. Perhaps there is a misunderstanding by Ger-
man and English readers concerning the translation 
of the German terms Gemeinwesen and Gemein-
schaft. In English I use the term “community,” which 
does not have the burden of the German discourse 
about Gemeinschaft derived from the sociologist 
Tönnies. In my view, the English term “polity” 
might best translate Gemeinwesen— but this term 
in turn would evoke a mainly political community.
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6. The Coordinate System
Every war is accordingly defined in terms of the three 
tendencies of violence/force, fight, and the affiliation of the 
combatants with a community, since in war there are al-
ways communities that fight against one another (although 
the weapon carriers can act on behalf of the community or 
constitute it). Moreover, these three tendencies within the 
wondrous trinity are further differentiated into additional 
opposites from which every war is composed, in different 
ways. Thus every war has symmetrical and asymmetrical 
tendencies, even when it may appear in certain situations as 
if only one of these tendencies comes to the fore.
The paradoxical aspect of criticism of Clausewitz is that 
Clausewitz himself is well equipped to respond to it. Keegan 
is obviously criticizing the early Clausewitz, the supporter 
of Napoleon’s strategy and of the destruction principle as 
a military method. Van Creveld, by contrast, is attacking 
the late Clausewitz, who emphasized the antithesis between 
limited and unlimited warfare, which became the critical 
point of his planned revision of the whole work (Clausewitz 
only managed to revise the first chapter of the first book).27 
In this respect, Keegan’s criticism could be answered by the 
later Clausewitz, while the early Clausewitz can respond to 
van Creveld’s criticism.
But, most important, both critiques show how current 
attempts to develop a non-Clausewitzian theory of war 
take place within a field of antitheses whose bounds were 
set out by the early and later Clausewitz himself. Although 
the early Clausewitz was oriented toward the Napoleonic 
strategy of unconditional offensive and the destruction of 
the enemy (i.e. beyond the enemy’s military defeat), the po-
sition of the later Clausewitz was defined by other priorities 
resulting from Napoleon’s failures in the Russian campaign 
and his defeats at Leipzig and especially Waterloo. In this 
later period, the difference between limited and unlimited 
Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity as coordinate system of war and violent conflict
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27 See Clausewitz’s note from July 
1827; Clausewitz 1984, 69–70.
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warfare and the insight into the necessity of war’s limitation 
became the focal points of Clausewitz’s thinking.
In accordance with the contrasting propositions of the early 
and the late Clausewitz, my coordinate system concentrates 
on the transitions between opposites as well as on their 
respective internal logic, rather than on action maxims 
derived from only one of these poles, as has so often pre-
vailed in the history of warfare. Such a transition between 
opposites can be observed when an irregular partisan 
army, having gained a certain degree of military strength, 
moves from an asymmetrical strategy to a symmetrical 
fight; it also characterizes the transformation of the highly 
asymmetrical ideological conflict between the former 
superpowers and their alliance systems in the Cold War 
into a symmetrical effort by both sides to avoid atomic war 
(Herberg-Rothe 2003).
7. A General Theory of War?
Finally, we have to answer the question: to what extent 
does this coordinate system, based on my interpretation of 
Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity, enables in principle (with 
further differentiations) a general theory of war and violent 
conflict? In my opinion, other competing approaches derive 
their theories from only one of these conflicting tendencies, 
all of which contribute to every war. For example, Marx’s 
analysis is based on the assumption that war depends on the 
economically or socially determined interests of the war-
ring parties. Despite their differences with respect to other 
aspects, Panajotis Kondylis (Kondylis 1988) as well as Mar-
tin van Creveld concentrate only on the concept of violent 
fighting. Additionally, Kondylis as well as Keegan substitute 
Clausewitz’s concept of politics—or at least their reduction-
istic interpretation of it through the concept of culture. To 
give another example, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz’s greatest oppo-
nent in the current discourse about war (although they have 
been dead for millennia and centuries, respectively), con-
centrates on the concept of struggle as a universal principle 
by neglecting particular political dimensions. Even the “war 
of interpretation” in the German discourse between Gewalt-
Innovateure and so called traditionalists could be framed as 
a dispute about whether Clausewitz’s first or the third of his 
three conflicting tendencies of war and violent conflict is 
put at the center of the interpretation (Trotha 1997).
In contrast to these single-cause approaches, in my inter-
pretation Clausewitz’s theory of war is based on dialectic 
opposites which together constitute war as a whole: he 
describes violence as both an independent force and an 
instrumental tool with which communities preserve their 
identities and pursue their interests. In contrast to all other 
approaches, Clausewitz’s theory is based on three conflict-
ing tendencies. These tendencies are the borders within 
which war happens. As long as communities wage war in 
order to preserve their identities as well as pursue their 
interests, Clausewitz’s theory is the appropriate tool for 
analyzing war and violent conflict.28
In summary, I would define war as the violent fight of com-
munities. This definition articulates three different as well 
as conflicting tendencies: at first violence/force, then fight/
struggle, and finally the nature of the warring communi-
ties. One could further differentiate each of these tendencies 
to develop a systematically as well as historically informed 
general theory of war and violent conflict.
28 Instead of adding a necessarily too short analysis 
of a current conflict as a demonstration of the 
usefulness of my coordinate system, I would like 
to refer to the discussions in which I have already 
used it as a guiding principle: my critique of the 
so called “new wars,” the estimation of a re-polit-
icization of war and violent conflict, the concept 
of a new containment of war and violent conflict, 
and finally the notion of a democratic warrior: see 
Herberg-Rothe 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; Herberg-
Rothe and Honig 2007. I outline the problems of 
supplementing Clausewitz through a particular 
understanding of Sun Tzu with respect to the 
Iraq war in the preface to Herberg-Rothe 2007.
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